A requires/provides model for computer attacks
Proceedings of the 2000 workshop on New security paradigms
Physical Security Devices for Computer Subsystems: A Survey of Attacks and Defences
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Secure bootstrap is not enough: shoring up the trusted computing base
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Keep your enemies close: distance bounding against smartcard relay attacks
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Recovery of Encryption Keys from Memory Using a Linear Scan
ARES '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Effectiveness of Physical, Social and Digital Mechanisms against Laptop Theft in Open Organizations
GREENCOM-CPSCOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/ACM Int'l Conference on Green Computing and Communications & Int'l Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing
Examining a Large Keystroke Biometrics Dataset for Statistical-Attack Openings
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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We discuss five attack strategies against BitLocker, which target the way BitLocker is using the TPM sealing mechanism. BitLocker is a disk encryption feature included in some versions of Microsoft Windows. It represents a state-of-the-art design, enhanced with TPM support for improved security. We show that, under certain assumptions, a dedicated attacker can circumvent the protection and break confidentiality with limited effort. Our attacks neither exploit vulnerabilities in the encryption itself nor do they directly attack the TPM. They rather exploit sequences of actions that Trusted Computing fails to prevent, demonstrating limitations of the technology.