Chernoff-Type Direct Product Theorems

  • Authors:
  • Russell Impagliazzo;Ragesh Jaiswal;Valentine Kabanets

  • Affiliations:
  • University of California San Diego, San Diego, USA and Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton, USA;University of California San Diego, San Diego, USA;Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

Consider a challenge-response protocol where the probability of a correct response is at least α for a legitimate user and at most βα for an attacker. One example is a CAPTCHA challenge, where a human should have a significantly higher chance of answering a single challenge (e.g., uncovering a distorted letter) than an attacker; another example is an argument system without perfect completeness. A natural approach to boost the gap between legitimate users and attackers is to issue many challenges and accept if the response is correct for more than a threshold fraction, for the threshold chosen between α and β. We give the first proof that parallel repetition with thresholds improves the security of such protocols. We do this with a very general result about an attacker’s ability to solve a large fraction of many independent instances of a hard problem, showing a Chernoff-like convergence of the fraction solved incorrectly to the probability of failure for a single instance.