Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Password authentication with insecure communication
Communications of the ACM
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Improving the security of 'a flexible biometrics remote user authentication scheme'
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Cryptanalysis and improvement on two efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards
Computer Standards & Interfaces
A new method for using hash functions to solve remote user authentication
Computers and Electrical Engineering
A new mutual authentication scheme based on nonce and smart cards
Computer Communications
An improved bilinear pairing based remote user authentication scheme
Computer Standards & Interfaces
A secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment
Computer Standards & Interfaces
A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
An efficient remote use authentication scheme using smart cards
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
Cryptanalysis of a remote user authentication scheme using smart cards
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
WSEAS Transactions on Information Science and Applications
A new dynamic ID-Based remote user authentication scheme with forward secrecy
APWeb'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Web Technologies and Applications
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Recently, Wang et al. showed that two new verifier-free remote user password authentication schemes, Ku-Chen's scheme and Yoon et al.'s scheme, are vulnerable to an off-line password guessing attack, a forgery attack, and a denial-of-service attack, and then proposed an improved scheme for the real application in resource-limited environments. Unfortunately, we find that Wang et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to an impersonation attack and an off-line password guessing attack. In addition, Wang et al.'s scheme is not easily reparable and is unable to provide perfect forward secrecy. Finally, we propose an improved scheme with better security strength.