The blocker tag: selective blocking of RFID tags for consumer privacy
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
RFID security without extensive cryptography
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
EMAP: an efficient mutual-authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags
OTM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: AWeSOMe, CAMS, COMINF, IS, KSinBIT, MIOS-CIAO, MONET - Volume Part I
A case against currently used hash functions in RFID protocols
OTM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: AWeSOMe, CAMS, COMINF, IS, KSinBIT, MIOS-CIAO, MONET - Volume Part I
Authenticating pervasive devices with human protocols
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
RFID security and privacy: a research survey
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Securing RFID systems conforming to EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standard
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Weaknesses in two recent lightweight RFID authentication protocols
Inscrypt'09 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
A Study on Secure RFID Mutual Authentication Scheme
GREENCOM-CPSCOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/ACM Int'l Conference on Green Computing and Communications & Int'l Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing
Flaws on RFID grouping-proofs. Guidelines for future sound protocols
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Attacks on a lightweight mutual authentication protocol under EPC C-1 G-2 standard
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
EMAP: An efficient mutual authentication protocol for passive RFID tags
International Journal of Automation and Computing
RFID system for public train transportation
Security and Communication Networks
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Recently, Chien et al. proposed an RFID authentication protocol, which consists of only the cyclic redundancy code (CRC) and the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) [H. Chien, C. Chen, Mutual Authentication Protocol for RFID Conforming to EPC Class 1 Generation 2 Standards, Computer Standards & Interfaces, vol. 29, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 254-259]. They claimed that the protocol conforms to current EPC tags, and would be secure against all attacks on RFID systems. However, in this paper, we show that the protocol is not secure; firstly an attacker can impersonate a valid tag temporarily by a single eavesdropping. Secondly the attacker can forge a tag permanently by eavesdropping two consecutive sessions. Finally he can make a valid tag useless (DoS attack) by modifying the second attack slightly. The computational complexities of the attacks are so practicable that Chien et al.'s protocol cannot enhance the RFID security any more than the original EPC standard.