A New Lattice Construction for Partial Key Exposure Attack for RSA

Authors:
Yoshinori Aono
Affiliations:
Dept. of Mathematical and Computing Sciences, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan
Venue:
Irvine Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09
Year:
2009

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Abstract

In this paper we present a new lattice construction for a lattice based partial key exposure attack for the RSA cryptography. We consider the situation that the RSA secret key d is small and a sufficient amount of the LSBs (least significant bits) of d are known by the attacker. We show that our lattice construction is theoretically more efficient than known attacks proposed in [2,7].