The Security of Cipher Block Chaining
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the Hardware Implementation of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms
ISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Security
Analysis of 3gpp-MAC and two-key 3gpp-MAC
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Special issue: International workshop on coding and cryptography (WCC 2001)
UMTS security: system architecture and hardware implementation: Research Articles
Wireless Communications & Mobile Computing
An update on the side channel cryptanalysis of MACs based on cryptographic hash functions
INDOCRYPT'07 Proceedings of the cryptology 8th international conference on Progress in cryptology
A related-key rectangle attack on the full KASUMI
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Side channel attacks on message authentication codes
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
Side channel attacks against HMACs based on block-cipher based hash functions
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
On the security of iterated message authentication codes
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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In recent years, several side channel attacks have been given to some provably secure Message Authentication (MA) schemes. These side channel attacks help adversaries to get some information about secret values (such like internal states) in MA-schemes, which is beyond the original models consider about, so the provable security completely lose. To fix this problem, we extend the original models for message authentication, taking the information about secret values in MA-schemes into account. The extended models can not only provide a framework under which one can discuss security of MA-schemes facing side channel attacks, but also give us an insight view of MA-schemes. As an example, we consider the security of f 9 (a MA-scheme in 3GPP) and its variants in an extended model. The result helps us to know f 9 better, e.g. how to use it safely and what measures need to be taken in case of potential attacks.