On codes with the identifiable parent property
Journal of Combinatorial Theory Series A
An Efficient Public Key Traitor Tracing Scheme
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CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Collusion-Secure Fingerprinting for Digital Data (Extended Abstract)
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Traitor Tracing with Constant Transmission Rate
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
INDOCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Cryptology in India: Progress in Cryptology
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
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DRM '01 Revised Papers from the ACM CCS-8 Workshop on Security and Privacy in Digital Rights Management
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Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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SFCS '84 Proceedings of the 25th Annual Symposium onFoundations of Computer Science, 1984
Efficient Traitor Tracing from Collusion Secure Codes
ICITS '08 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information Theoretic Security
Pirate evolution: how to make the most of your traitor keys
CRYPTO'07 Proceedings of the 27th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Traitor tracing for stateful pirate decoders with constant ciphertext rate
VIETCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Cryptology in Vietnam
Generic construction of hybrid public key traitor tracing with full-public-traceability
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
Public traceability in traitor tracing schemes
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Fully collusion resistant traitor tracing with short ciphertexts and private keys
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Traitor tracing against public collaboration
ISPEC'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information security practice and experience
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Identity-based trace and revoke schemes
ProvSec'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Provable security
A public-key traitor tracing scheme with an optimal transmission rate
ICICS'09 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Information and Communications Security
Codes based tracing and revoking scheme with constant ciphertext
ProvSec'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Provable Security
Message-Based traitor tracing with optimal ciphertext rate
LATINCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America
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This work introduces a new concept of attack against traitor tracing schemes. We call attacks of this type Pirates 2.0 attacks as they result from traitors collaborating together in a public way . In other words, traitors do not secretly collude but display part of their secret keys in a public place; pirate decoders are then built from this public information. The distinguishing property of Pirates 2.0 attacks is that traitors only contribute partial information about their secret key material which suffices to produce (possibly imperfect) pirate decoders while allowing them to remain anonymous. The side-effect is that traitors can publish their contributed information without the risk of being traced; giving such strong incentives to some of the legitimate users to become traitors allows coalitions to attain very large sizes that were deemed unrealistic in some previously considered models of coalitions. This paper proposes a generic model for this new threat, that we use to assess the security of some of the most famous traitor tracing schemes. We exhibit several Pirates 2.0 attacks against these schemes, providing new theoretical insights with respect to their security. We also describe practical attacks against various instances of these schemes. Eventually, we discuss possible variations on the Pirates 2.0 theme.