A generalized linear production model: A unifying model
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
On the core of network synthesis games
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Mathematics of Operations Research
A General Framework for the Study of Decentralized Distribution Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
A Three-Stage Model for a Decentralized Distribution System of Retailers
Operations Research
Warehouse-Retailer Network Design Problem
Operations Research
Stable Farsighted Coalitions in Competitive Markets
Management Science
Shipment Consolidation: Who Pays for It and How Much?
Management Science
Primal-Dual Algorithms for Deterministic Inventory Problems
Mathematics of Operations Research
A Cost-Sharing Method for the Soft-Capacitated Economic Lot-Sizing Game
COCOA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
A Stochastic Programming Duality Approach to Inventory Centralization Games
Operations Research
Cost sharing in distribution problems for franchise operations
Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions
Cooperation in Service Systems
Operations Research
Capacity Allocation and Scheduling in Supply Chains
Operations Research
A cost-sharing method for an economic lot-sizing game
Operations Research Letters
Polymatroid Optimization, Submodularity, and Joint Replenishment Games
Operations Research
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We consider the one-warehouse multiple retailer inventory model with a submodular joint setup cost function. The objective of this model is to determine an inventory replenishment policy that minimizes the long-run average system cost over an infinite time horizon. Although the optimal policy for this problem is still unknown, a class of easy-to-implement power-of-two policies are 98% effective. This paper focuses on how the cost, under an optimal power-of-two policy, should be allocated to the retailers. This question generates an interesting cooperative game. We prove that this cooperative game has a nonempty core. The key to our result is a strong duality theorem for the one-warehouse multiple retailer problem under power-of-two policies.