Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Models for the Logic of Proofs
LFCS '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Logical Foundations of Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science - Clifford lectures and the mathematical foundations of programming semantics
Introducing Justification into Epistemic Logic
Journal of Logic and Computation
An Equivalence between Dependencies in Nested Databases and a Fragment of Propositional Logic
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Evidence reconstruction of epistemic modal logic S5
CSR'06 Proceedings of the First international computer science conference on Theory and Applications
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Several justification logics have been created, starting with the logic LP, (Artemov, Bull Symbolic Logic 7(1):1---36, 2001). These can be thought of as explicit versions of modal logics, or of logics of knowledge or belief, in which the unanalyzed necessity (knowledge, belief) operator has been replaced with a family of explicit justification terms. We begin by sketching the basics of justification logics and their relations with modal logics. Then we move to new material. Modal logics come in various strengths. For their corresponding justification logics, differing strength is reflected in different vocabularies. What we show here is that for justification logics corresponding to modal logics extending T, various familiar extensions are actually conservative with respect to each other. Our method of proof is very simple, and general enough to handle several justification logics not directly corresponding to distinct modal logics. Our methods do not, however, allow us to prove comparable results for justification logics corresponding to modal logics that do not extend T. That is, we are able to handle explicit logics of knowledge, but not explicit logics of belief. This remains open.