A new approach to auctions and resilient mechanism design

Authors:
Jing Chen;Silvio Micali
Affiliations:
CSAIL, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA;CSAIL, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We put forward a new approach to mechanism design, and exemplify it via a new mechanism guaranteeing significant revenue in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Our mechanism (1) succeeds in a new and very adversarial collusion model; (2) works in a new, equilibrium-less, and very strong solution concept; (3) benchmarks its performance against the knowledge that the players have about each other; (4) is computationally efficient and preserves the players' privacy to an unusual extent.