Inefficiency of Nash equilibria
Mathematics of Operations Research
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Pricing and power control in a multicell wireless data network
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This paper studies efficiency in a Nash game with optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) target. Instead of looking from the view point of degree of efficiency ("price of anarchy"), we investigate the effects of parameters in individual cost functions. We show that the aggregate cost function in the game-theoretic formulation is not automatically convex and the optimal solution of the associated constrained optimization problem is not immediate. Then we build the relation between these two formulations by indicating that the individual cost function Ci(ui) in the system optimization formulation has an approximate interpretation with the one Ji(u) in the game-theoretic formulation. We compare simulation results from both a system optimization and a user optimization (game-theoretic) approach for a single optical link. It is well known that the Nash equilibria of a game may not achieve full efficiency. We show the effects of pricing mechanisms on system performance. We also show that OSNR target can be achieved and efficiency can be possibly improved by appropriate selection of parameters.