Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
Elements of Information Theory (Wiley Series in Telecommunications and Signal Processing)
NeXt generation/dynamic spectrum access/cognitive radio wireless networks: a survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A stackelberg game for power control and channel allocation in cognitive radio networks
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodologies and tools
The Water-Filling Game in Fading Multiple-Access Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Distributed multiuser power control for digital subscriber lines
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A game-theoretic approach to energy-efficient power control in multicarrier CDMA systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Non-Atomic Games for Multi-User Systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Cognitive radio: an enabling technology for the green radio communications concept
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing: Connecting the World Wirelessly
Introducing hierarchy in energy games
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
A hierarchical slotted aloha game
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
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We consider a multiple access channel where the users choose their best power control strategy in order to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. To increase the utilities with respect to the classical non-cooperative game, we introduce hierarchy in two ways. On the one hand, assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader. On the other hand, assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by using successive interference cancellation at the receiver. For both cases, we study the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and compare the individual performance obtained in the hierarchical game with that obtained in the non-cooperative game. An exhaustive comparative analysis of the two games is also conducted. In order to optimize the choice of the leader in the Stackelberg formulation (with single user decoding) and that of the decoding order (in the non-cooperative game with successive interference cancelation), we study two measures of global energy-efficiency for the network and discussions are provided for each case.