Stochastic population games with individual independent states and coupled constraints

Authors:
Hamidou Tembine;Eitan Altman;Rachid ElAzouzi;Yezekael Hayel
Affiliations:
University of Avignon, Agroparc BP, AVIGNON Cedex;INRIA, MAESTRO Group, Sophia-Antipolis Cedex;University of Avignon, Agroparc BP, AVIGNON Cedex;University of Avignon, Agroparc BP, AVIGNON Cedex
Venue:
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Year:
2008

Citing 2
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IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Evolutionary power control games in wireless networks

NETWORKING'08 Proceedings of the 7th international IFIP-TC6 networking conference on AdHoc and sensor networks, wireless networks, next generation internet

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Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative population games with several individual states and independent Markov process. Each member of each class of the population has (i) its own state (ii) its actions in each state, (iii) an instantaneous reward which depends on its state and the population's profile, (iv) a time-average (coupled) constraints. We apply this model to battery-dependent power control in wireless networks with several types of renewable energies. We show that the game has an equilibrium in stationary strategies under ergodic assumptions and we present a class of evolutionary game dynamics which converge to stationary equilibria.