Beta-skeletons have unbounded dilation
Computational Geometry: Theory and Applications
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Sensor-centric energy-constrained reliable query routing for wireless sensor networks
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Theoretical Computer Science - Game theory meets theoretical computer science
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
A price-based reliable routing game in wireless networks
GameNets '06 Proceeding from the 2006 workshop on Game theory for communications and networks
Bounded budget connection (BBC) games or how to make friends and influence people, on a budget
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Equilibria for broadcast range assignment games in ad-hoc networks
ADHOC-NOW'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Ad-Hoc, Mobile, and Wireless Networks
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We consider the problem of all-to-one (reverse multicast) selfish routing in the absence of a payment scheme in wireless networks, where a natural model for cost is the power required to forward. Whereas each node requires a path to the destination, it does not care how long that path is, so long as its own individual or local forwarding cost is minimized. Thus, we refer to this setting as a Locally Minimum Cost Forwarding Game (LMCF). From a system-wide perspective, short paths are clearly desirable, yielding two related social objectives of finding topologies that minimize: (i) the maximum stretch factor, and (ii) the directed weighted diameter. We prove that Nash equilibria always exist for LMCF, in particular the directed MST always being one, and we analyze the ratio of the social cost of Nash equilibria to the global optimum. The worst (maximum) possible value of this ratio is called the price of anarchy (PoA), and the best (minimum) possible value is called the price of stability (PoS). For the maximum stretch factor we present a Ω(n) worst-case bound on PoA and PoS, and for the directed weighted diameter we present a Ω(nc) worst-case bound on PoA and PoS for all c n) and Ω(nc) (for all c expected PoA is Ω(1) while the expected PoS is θ(1).