Short Communication: Matrix games with interval data

Authors:
Shiang-Tai Liu;Chiang Kao
Affiliations:
Graduate School of Business and Management, Vanung University, No. 1 Van-Nuang Road, Chung-Li, Tao-Yuan 320, Taiwan, ROC;Department of Industrial and Information Management, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan 701, Taiwan, ROC
Venue:
Computers and Industrial Engineering
Year:
2009

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Abstract

The conventional game theory is concerned with how rational individuals make decisions when they are faced with known payoffs. In the real world, sometimes the payoffs are not known and have to be estimated, and sometimes the payoffs are only approximately known. This paper develops a solution method for the two-person zero-sum game where the payoffs are imprecise and are represented by interval data. Since the payoffs are imprecise, the value of the game should be imprecise as well. A pair of two-level mathematical programs is formulated to obtain the upper bound and lower bound of the value of the game. Based on the duality theorem and by applying a variable substitution technique, the pair of two-level mathematical programs is transformed to a pair of ordinary one-level linear programs. Solving the pair of linear programs produces the interval of the value of the game. It is shown that the two players in the game have the same upper bound and lower bound for the value of the imprecise game. An example illustrates the whole idea and sheds some light on imprecise game.