A Retrospective on the VAX VMM Security Kernel
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A decentralized model for information flow control
Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
JFlow: practical mostly-static information flow control
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EROS: a fast capability system
Proceedings of the seventeenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Certification of programs for secure information flow
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A lattice model of secure information flow
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A note on the confinement problem
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Capability-Based Computer Systems
Capability-Based Computer Systems
Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies into the Linux Operating System
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Linux Security Modules: General Security Support for the Linux Kernel
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
IBM Systems Journal
Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Memory management
RIFLE: An Architectural Framework for User-Centric Information-Flow Security
Proceedings of the 37th annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
The DaCapo benchmarks: java benchmarking development and analysis
Proceedings of the 21st annual ACM SIGPLAN conference on Object-oriented programming systems, languages, and applications
Making information flow explicit in HiStar
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
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Information flow control for standard OS abstractions
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Enforcing authorization policies using transactional memory introspection
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Hardware enforcement of application security policies using tagged memory
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Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Execution leases: a hardware-supported mechanism for enforcing strong non-interference
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Decentralized information flow control on a bare-metal JVM
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Abstractions for usable information flow control in Aeolus
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User-aware privacy control via extended static-information-flow analysis
Proceedings of the 27th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering
SafeWeb: a middleware for securing ruby-based web applications
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Transforming commodity security policies to enforce Clark-Wilson integrity
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
An information flow control meta-model
Proceedings of the 18th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Position paper: Sapper -- a language for provable hardware policy enforcement
Proceedings of the Eighth ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
Preventing accidental data disclosure in modern operating systems
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Sapper: a language for hardware-level security policy enforcement
Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
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Decentralized information flow control (DIFC) is a promising model for writing programs with powerful, end-to-end security guarantees. Current DIFC systems that run on commodity hardware can be broadly categorized into two types: language-level and operating system-level DIFC. Language level solutions provide no guarantees against security violations on system resources, like files and sockets. Operating system solutions can mediate accesses to system resources, but are inefficient at monitoring the flow of information through fine-grained program data structures. This paper describes Laminar, the first system to implement decentralized information flow control using a single set of abstractions for OS resources and heap-allocated objects. Programmers express security policies by labeling data with secrecy and integrity labels, and then access the labeled data in lexically scoped security regions. Laminar enforces the security policies specified by the labels at runtime. Laminar is implemented using a modified Java virtual machine and a new Linux security module. This paper shows that security regions ease incremental deployment and limit dynamic security checks, allowing us to retrofit DIFC policies on four application case studies. Replacing the applications' ad-hoc security policies changes less than 10% of the code, and incurs performance overheads from 1% to 56%. Whereas prior DIFC systems only support limited types of multithreaded programs, Laminar supports a more general class of multithreaded DIFC programs that can access heterogeneously labeled data.