Efficient data structures for range-aggregate queries on trees
Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Database Theory
Authenticated join processing in outsourced databases
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of data
How to authenticate graphs without leaking
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Extending Database Technology
Continuous authentication on relational streams
The VLDB Journal — The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases
Super-efficient verification of dynamic outsourced databases
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
On securing untrusted clouds with cryptography
Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Authenticated Index Structures for Aggregation Queries
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Optimal authenticated data structures with multilinear forms
Pairing'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Pairing-based cryptography
Optimal verification of operations on dynamic sets
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Efficient verification of web-content searching through authenticated web crawlers
Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment
Signatures of correct computation
TCC'13 Proceedings of the 10th theory of cryptography conference on Theory of Cryptography
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In the third-party model for the distribution of data, the trusted data creator or owner provides an untrusted party D with data and integrity verification (IV) items for that data. When a user U gets a subset of the data at D or is already in possession of that subset, U may request from D the IV items that make it possible for U to verify the integrity of its data: D must then provide u with the (hopefully small) number of needed IVs. Most of the published work in this area uses the Merkle tree or variants thereof. For the problem of 2-dimensional range data, the best published solutions require D to store O(n log n) IV items for a database of n items, and allow a user U to be sent only O(log n) of those IVs for the purpose of verifying the integrity of the data it receives from D (regardless of the size of U's query rectangle). For data that is modeled as a 2-dimensional grid (such as GIS or image data), this paper shows that better bounds are possible: The number of IVs stored at D (and the time it takes to compute them) can be brought down to O(n), and the number of IVs sent to U for verification can be brought down to a constant.