Data networks
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Fairness and social risk I: unaggregated analyses
Management Science
Multiagent negotiation under time constraints
Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence
How to cut a cake almost fairly
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cake-Cutting Is Not a Piece of Cake
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Some complexity questions related to distributive computing(Preliminary Report)
STOC '79 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the Communication Complexity of Multilateral Trading: Extended Report
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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Negotiation in a multiagent system is a topic of active interest for enabling the allocation of scarce resources among autonomous agents. This paper presents a discussion of the research on negotiation criteria, which puts in context the contributions to resource allocation from the fields of economics, mathematics, and multiagent systems. We group the criteria based on how they relate to each other as well as their historical origin. In addition, we present three new criteria: verifiability, dimensionality, and topology. The criteria are organized into five categories. The allocation category contains criteria concerning fairness and envy-freeness with respect to how resources are allocated to agents. The protocol category covers criteria for stability, strategy-proofness, and communication costs. The procedure category includes criteria about the complexity of allocation procedures. The resource category has criteria for the properties that various resources can take and how they affect allocation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the criteria for agent utility functions. The overall objectives of this paper are (1) to create a starting point for protocol engineering by future negotiation designers and (2) to enumerate the criteria and their measures that enable negotiation and allocation mechanisms to be compared objectively.