Game-based admission control for wireless systems

  • Authors:
  • Benjamin Yolken;Nicholas Bambos

  • Affiliations:
  • Stanford University, Stanford, CA;Stanford University, Stanford, CA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 4th Annual International Conference on Wireless Internet
  • Year:
  • 2008

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Much previous work has examined the wireless power control problem using tools from game theory, an economic concept which describes the behavior of interdependent but non-cooperative users. In this paper, we expand these ideas to the antecedent process of deciding which users may participate in the network, i.e. the admission control problem. In particular, we propose three distinct pricing schemes for influencing users as they make their participation decisions. We fully characterize the equilibria induced by each and then test their performance in a simulated, wireless environment. Our preliminary results show that these schemes have the potential to produce high quality outcomes in an incentive-compatible way.