A survey of intrusion detection techniques
Computers and Security
Authentication via keystroke dynamics
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Testing and evaluating computer intrusion detection systems
Communications of the ACM
The base-rate fallacy and the difficulty of intrusion detection
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The 1999 DARPA off-line intrusion detection evaluation
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Special issue on recent advances in intrusion detection systems
Detection, Estimation, and Modulation Theory: Radar-Sonar Signal Processing and Gaussian Signals in Noise
InfraSec '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on Infrastructure Security
Experience with EMERALD to Date
Proceedings of the Workshop on Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring
An Immunological Approach to Change Detection: Algorithms, Analysis and Implications
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Firewall Design: Consistency, Completeness, and Compactness
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
The Value of Intrusion Detection Systems in Information Technology Security Architecture
Information Systems Research
The Economic Incentives for Sharing Security Information
Information Systems Research
Guide to Firewalls and Network Security: Intrusion Detection and VPNs
Guide to Firewalls and Network Security: Intrusion Detection and VPNs
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals
Security+ Guide to Networking Security Fundamentals, Second Edition
Security+ Guide to Networking Security Fundamentals, Second Edition
Principles of Information Security
Principles of Information Security
Network Software Security and User Incentives
Management Science
Efficiency of Vulnerability Disclosure Mechanisms to Disseminate Vulnerability Knowledge
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Security Patch Management: Share the Burden or Share the Damage?
Management Science
Intrusion-Detection Policies for IT Security Breaches
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Let the Pirates Patch? An Economic Analysis of Software Security Patch Restrictions
Information Systems Research
Decision-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Approaches to IT Security Investment
Journal of Management Information Systems
An Analysis of the Impact of Passenger Profiling for Transportation Security
Operations Research
Decision support for Cybersecurity risk planning
Decision Support Systems
Information Systems Research
Goals and Practices in Maintaining Information Systems Security
International Journal of Information Security and Privacy
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Proper configuration of security technologies is critical to balance the needs for access and protection of information. The common practice of using a layered security architecture that has multiple technologies amplifies the need for proper configuration because the configuration decision about one security technology has ramifications for the configuration decisions about others. Furthermore, security technologies rely on each other for their operations, thereby affecting each other's contribution. In this paper we study configuration of and interaction between a firewall and intrusion detection systems (IDS). We show that deploying a technology, whether it is the firewall or the IDS, could hurt the firm if the configuration is not optimized for the firm's environment. A more serious consequence of deploying the two technologies with suboptimal configurations is that even if the firm could benefit when each is deployed alone, the firm could be hurt by deploying both. Configuring the IDS and the firewall optimally eliminates the conflict between them, ensuring that if the firm benefits from deploying each of these technologies when deployed alone, it will always benefit from deploying both. When optimally configured, we find that these technologies complement or substitute each other. Furthermore, we find that while the optimal configuration of an IDS does not change whether it is deployed alone or together with a firewall, the optimal configuration of a firewall has a lower detection rate (i.e., allowing more access) when it is deployed with an IDS than when deployed alone. Our results highlight the complex interactions between firewall and IDS technologies when they are used together in a security architecture, and, hence, the need for proper configuration to benefit from these technologies.