Brain Meets Brawn: Why Grid and Agents Need Each Other
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method
Management Science
Flexible service provisioning with advance agreements
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1
A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Scalable mechanism design for the procurement of services with uncertain durations
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper, we consider the problem faced by an agent contracting multiple self-interested service providers, that are able to flexibly manipulate their quality of service in order to maximise their own utility, to complete a single computational task. We extend an existing model of such service providers, and derive optimal task procurement mechanisms in the setting where the agent has full knowledge of the cost functions of these service providers (considering both simultaneously and sequentially procurement). We then extend these results to the incomplete information setting where the agent must elicit cost information from the service providers, and we characterise a family of incentive-compatible and individually-rational mechanisms. Sequential procurement always generates greater utility for an agent than simultaneous procurement, and contracting multiple providers is preferable to contracting just one.