Constrained coalitional games: formal framework, properties, and complexity results

Authors:
Gianluigi Greco;Enrico Malizia;Luigi Palopoli;Francesco Scarcello
Affiliations:
University of Calabria, Rende, Italy;University of Calabria, Rende, Italy;University of Calabria, Rende, Italy;University of Calabria, Rende, Italy
Venue:
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Year:
2009

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Abstract

A general approach to define constrained coalitional games is proposed, i.e., TU games where additional, application-oriented constraints are imposed on the possible outcomes. It is observed that constrained games are succinct NonTransferable (NTU) specifications, which yet retain (some of) the nice properties of the underlying TU games. In fact, a clear picture about the preservation properties of TU solution concepts is depicted, and a thorough analysis is eventually carried out, to assess the impact of issuing constraints on the computational complexity of these solution concepts.