A Binomial Model of Group Probability Judgments

  • Authors:
  • Daniel E. O'Leary

  • Affiliations:
  • Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0441

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Collaborative Decision Making: Perspectives and Challenges
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

Research in psychology has found that subjects regularly exhibit a conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Additional research has led to the finding of other fallacies in probability judgment, including disjunction and conditional fallacies. Such analyses of judgments are critical because of the substantial amount of probability judgment done in business and organizational settings. However, previous research has been conducted in the environment of a single decision maker. Since business and other organizational environments also employ groups, it is important to determine the impact of groups on such cognitive fallacies. This paper finds that groups substantially mitigate the impact of probability judgment fallacies among the sample of subjects investigated. A statistical analysis, based on a binomial distribution, suggests that groups investigated here did not use consensus. Instead, if any one member of the group has correct knowledge about the probability relationships, then the group uses that knowledge and does not exhibit fallacy in probability judgment. These results suggest that at least for this setting, groups have a willingness to collaborate and share and use knowledge from the group.