Towards a general theory of action and time
Artificial Intelligence
Nonmonotonic logic and temporal projection
Artificial Intelligence
Reasoning about action II: the qualification problem
Artificial Intelligence
Temporal ontology and temporal reference
Computational Linguistics - Special issue on tense and aspect
A critical examination of Allen's theory of action and time
Artificial Intelligence
Proving properties of states in the situation calculus
Artificial Intelligence
Solving the frame problem: a mathematical investigation of the common sense law of inertia
Solving the frame problem: a mathematical investigation of the common sense law of inertia
Explanatory update theory: applications of counterfactual reasoning to causation
Artificial Intelligence
Knowlege in action: logical foundations for specifying and implementing dynamical systems
Knowlege in action: logical foundations for specifying and implementing dynamical systems
Reasoning and acting in time
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on logical formalizations and commonsense reasoning
On What Goes On: The Ontology of Processes and Events
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference (FOIS 2006)
Simultaneous Events and the “Once-Only” Effect
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference (FOIS 2006)
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Effect axioms constitute the cornerstone of formal theories of action in AI. They drive standard reasoning tasks, especially prediction. These tasks need not be coupled with actual acting; the reasoning agent is, thus, typically given an ex post acto narrative of what actions took place. An acting agent, however, has no access to such knowledge; it needs to face what we call the event categorization problem, and figure out what actions it did. Until this is achieved, effect axioms will be useless. A careful review of the literature on effect axioms reveals that their syntax, semantics, and ontological commitments are so deeply entrenched in the armchair reasoning about action paradigm, that they cannot be used in resolving the event categorization problem. By enriching the ontology of action theories, we propose a different approach for representing effects of actions that unifies the two views. The enriched ontology is independently motivated by linguistic concerns.