More on Presumptions and Burdens of Proof

Authors:
Henry Prakken;Giovanni Sartor
Affiliations:
Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University and Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands;CIRSFID, University of Bologna and European University Institute, Law Department, Florence, Italy
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems: JURIX 2008: The Twenty-First Annual Conference
Year:
2008

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Abstract

This paper extends our previous logical analysis of presumptions and burden of proof by studying the force of a presumption once counterevidence has been offered. In the jurisprudential literature different accounts of this issue have been given: some have argued that a presumption is nullified by counterarguments while others have maintained that this gives presumptions a force that is too slight. We argue that these differences largely are not a matter of logic but of legal policy, and we show how the various accounts can be logically formalised.