Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards a Completeness Result for Model Checking of Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Theory generation for security protocols
Theory generation for security protocols
Deciding the Security of Protocols with Commuting Public Key Encryption
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Verification of cryptographic Protocols: tagging enforces termination
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
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Given a cryptographic protocol, it is possible to extract an inference system modelling exactly the set of messages an active intruder can learn by manipulating this protocol. Unfortunately, there is no general proof-search procedure to test whether or not a term belongs to the theory of an inference system. This paper presents the preliminary results obtained during an attempt to circumvent this problem. First, it explains a transformation process over inference systems; then presents a decision procedure (using the transformation process) for the security of a class of cryptographic protocols, called structured protocols; and finally argues that some basic security properties are decidable for such cryptographic protocols. The security properties include secrecy and chaoticity; the results can possibly be extended to cover authentication as well.