International Journal of Game Theory
Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Sybilproof reputation mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
Graphs and Hypergraphs
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithmic Game Theory
On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
Mathematics of Operations Research
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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Each user of the network needs to connect a pair of target nodes. There are no variable congestion costs, only a direct connection cost for each pair of nodes. A centralized mechanism elicits target pairs from users, and builds the cheapest forest meeting all demands. We look for cost sharing rules satisfying • Routing-proofness: no user can lower its cost by reporting as several users along an alternative path connecting his target nodes; • Stand Alone core stability: no group of users pay more than the cost of a subnetwork meeting all connection needs of the group. We construct first two core stable and routing-proof rules when connecting costs are all 0 or 1. One is derived from the random spanning tree weighted by the volume of traffic on each edge; the other is the weighted Shapley value of the Stand Alone cooperative game. For arbitrary connecting costs, we prove that the core is non empty if the graph of target pairs connects all pairs of nodes. Then we extend both rules above by the piecewise-linear technique. The former rule is computable in polynomial time, the latter is not.