Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Coalition formation with uncertain heterogeneous information
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
The Advantages of Compromising in Coalition Formation with Incomplete Information
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Distributing coalitional value calculations among cooperative agents
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Coalition Formation Strategies for Self-Interested Agents
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Coalition Formation Strategies for Self-Interested Agents in Hedonic Games
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
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This paper addresses the coalition formation problem in multiagent systems. Although several coalition formation models exist today, coalition formation using these models remains costly. As a consequence, applying these models through several iterations when required becomes time-consuming. This paper proposes a new coalition formation mechanism (CFM) to reduce this execution cost. This mechanism is based on four principles: (1) the use of information on task relationships so as to reduce the computational complexity of the coalition formation; (2) the exploitation of the coalition proposals formulated by certain agents in order to derive their intentions, (this principle makes the search for solutions easier, which in turn may result in earlier consensus and agreements-the intention derivation process is performed on a new graph structure introduced in this paper); (3) the use of several strategies for propagating the proposals of the agents in the coalition formation process; and (4) the dynamic reorganization of previous coalitions.