A game-theoretic memory mechanism for coevolution
GECCO'03 Proceedings of the 2003 international conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation: PartI
A fast and elitist multiobjective genetic algorithm: NSGA-II
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
Oligopoly game modeling for cognitive radio environments
ruSMART/NEW2AN'10 Proceedings of the Third conference on Smart Spaces and next generation wired, and 10th international conference on Wireless networking
Lorenz equilibrium: equitability in non-cooperative games
Proceedings of the 14th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
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A general technique for detecting equilibria in finite non cooperative games is proposed. Fundamental idea is that every equilibrium is characterized by a binary relation on the game strategies. This relation - called generative relation -- induces an appropriate domination concept. Game equilibrium is described as the set of non dominated strategies with respect to the generative relation. Slight generalizations of some well known equilibrium concepts are proposed. A population of strategies is evolved according to a domination-based ranking in oder to produce better and better equilibrium approximations. Eventually the process converges towards the game equilibrium. The proposed technique opens an way for qualitative approach of game equilibria. In order to illustrate the proposed evolutionary technique different equilibria for different continuous games are studied. Numerical experiments indicate the potential of the proposed concepts and technique.