Very-Efficient Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange and Its Extensions

  • Authors:
  • Seonghan Shin;Kazukuni Kobara;Hideki Imai

  • Affiliations:
  • National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), Tokyo, Japan 101-0021 and Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan 112-8551;National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), Tokyo, Japan 101-0021 and Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan 112-8551;Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan 112-8551 and National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Research Center for Information Security (RCIS), Tokyo, Japan 101-0021

  • Venue:
  • AAECC-18 '09 Proceedings of the 18th International Symposium on Applied Algebra, Algebraic Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes
  • Year:
  • 2009

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

An anonymous password-authenticated key exchange (anonymous PAKE) protocol is designed to provide both password-only authentication and user anonymity. In this paper, we propose a very-efficient anonymous PAKE (called, VEAP) protocol that provides the most efficiency among their kinds in terms of computation and communication costs. The VEAP protocol guarantees semantic security of session keys in the random oracle model under the chosen target CDH problem, and unconditional user anonymity against a semi-honest server. If the pre-computation is allowed, the computation cost of the VEAP protocol is the same as the well-known Diffie-Hellman protocol! In addition, we extend the VEAP protocol in two ways.