Design and verification of secure systems
SOSP '81 Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Partitioning in Avionics Architectures: Requirements, Mechanisms, and Assurance
Partitioning in Avionics Architectures: Requirements, Mechanisms, and Assurance
The AADL behaviour annex -- experiments and roadmap
ICECCS '07 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE International Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems
AADL modeling and analysis of hierarchical schedulers
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM international conference on SIGAda annual international conference
A component model for hard real-time systems: CCM with ARINC-653
Software—Practice & Experience
XtratuM/PPC: a hypervisor for partitioned system on PowerPC processors
The Journal of Supercomputing
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Design and validation of safety-critical systems are crucial because faults or security issues could have significant impacts (loss of life, mission failure, etc.). Each year, millions of dollars are lost due to these kinds of issues. Consequently, safety and security requirements must be enforced. Systems must be validated against these requirements to improve safety and security and to make them more reliable and robust. We present our approach to avoid such issues by modeling safe and secure systems with both safety and security requirements. We rely on a modeling language (AADL) to model and design partitioned systems with their requirements and constraints. We then validate these models to ensure security and safety enforcement. We also discuss how this approach can be used to automatically generate and build safe and secure partitioned systems.