The Role of Anticipation on Cooperation and Coordination in Simulated Prisoner's Dilemma Game Playing

Authors:
Maurice Grinberg;Emilian Lalev
Affiliations:
Central- and Eastern European Center for Cognitive Science, Sofia, Bulgaria 1618;Central- and Eastern European Center for Cognitive Science, Sofia, Bulgaria 1618
Venue:
Anticipatory Behavior in Adaptive Learning Systems
Year:
2009

Citing 3
Cited 0

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Backward vs. Forward-Oriented Decision Making in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Comparison Between Two Connectionist Models

Anticipatory Behavior in Adaptive Learning Systems

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Abstract

We present a connectionist model for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game which we explored in different game-playing environments. The role of anticipation on cooperation and coordination was our main interest. The model was validated by comparisons with human subjects' experiments in which subjects played individually against a computer opponent. After reproducing several interesting characteristics of individual play, we used the model in multi-agent simulations of small societies in which agents interacted among each-other by playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In genetic simulations, we demonstrated how anticipation will evolve in the societies to achieve either higher cooperation rates or payoffs. Our results favor the assumption that anticipation is decisive for high level of cooperation and higher cooperative coordination in the simulated societies.