The random oracle methodology, revisited (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Malicious KGC attacks in certificateless cryptography
ASIACCS '07 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Certificateless signature revisited
ACISP'07 Proceedings of the 12th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Generic certificateless encryption in the standard model
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
An efficient certificateless signature scheme
CIS'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Computational Intelligence and Security - Volume Part II
On the security of certificateless signature schemes from asiacrypt 2003
CANS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Cryptology and Network Security
An efficient certificateless signature scheme
EUC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Emerging Directions in Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing
Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Certificateless public-key signature: security model and efficient construction
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Key replacement attack against a generic construction of certificateless signature
ACISP'06 Proceedings of the 11th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
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The only known construction of certificateless signature sche-mes that can be proven secure against a malicious Key Generation Center (KGC) requires the random oracle model to prove the security. In this paper, we present a certificateless signa ure scheme which is secure against malicious-but-passive KGC attack without random oracle. The security of our scheme based on our proposed complexity assumptions we call the Augmented Computational Diffie-Hellman (ACDH) assumption and 2-Many Diffie-Hellman (2-Many-DH) assumption. At the same time, we discuss the relationship between the new assumptions and some related problems.