Cryptanalysis of Vortex

Authors:
Jean-Philippe Aumasson;Orr Dunkelman;Florian Mendel;Christian Rechberger;Søren S. Thomsen
Affiliations:
FHNW, Windisch, Switzerland;École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France;IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Austria;IAIK, Graz University of Technology, Austria;DTU Mathematics, Technical University of Denmark,
Venue:
AFRICACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in Africa: Progress in Cryptology
Year:
2009

Citing 8
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Abstract

Vortex is a hash function that was first presented at ISC'2008, then submitted to the NIST SHA-3 competition after some modifications. This paper describes several attacks on both versions of Vortex, including collisions, second preimages, preimages, and distinguishers. Our attacks exploit flaws both in the high-level design and in the lower-level algorithms.