Receiver-driven layered multicast
Conference proceedings on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Uniform versus priority dropping for layered video
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '98 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Profit guaranteeing mechanisms for multicast networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Pricing and Fee Sharing for Point to Multipoint and Quality Guaranteed Multicast Services
ICPADS '00 Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems: Workshops
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Pricing multicasting in more flexible network models
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Multicast Extension of Unicast Charging for QoS Services
ECUMN '07 Proceedings of the Fourth European Conference on Universal Multiservice Networks
Fair Cost Sharing among Multicast Receivers
ICDT '07 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Digital Telecommunications
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In scenarios where many receivers simultaneously are interested in the same data, multicast transmission is more bandwidth efficient than unicast. The reason is that the receivers of a multicast session share the resources through a common transmission tree. Since the resources are shared between the receivers, it is reasonable that the costs corresponding to these resources should be shared as well. This paper deals with fair cost sharing among multicast receivers, and the work is based upon the assumption that costs should be shared according to the resource usage. However, it is not for certain that an optimally fair cost allocation is most beneficial for the receivers; receivers that cannot cover their fair share of the costs may nevertheless be able to contribute to the cost sharing to some extent. We propose a cost-allocation mechanism that strives to allocate the costs fairly, but gives discount to poor receivers who at least manage to cover the additional cost of providing them with the service.