On providing sink anonymity for sensor networks

  • Authors:
  • Edith C.-H. Ngai

  • Affiliations:
  • Uppsala University, Sweden

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing: Connecting the World Wirelessly
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

The sinks usually in sensor networks usually broadcast their addresses for data collection. However, this common operation opens up vulnerability for adversary to attack the sinks and obstruct their normal functions. In this paper, we suggest sink anonymity as a novel approach for data collection, which protects the privacy of the sinks and avoids them to become the target of attacks. We provide sink anonymity by omitting the address of the sinks in routing, so that the identity and location of the sinks are kept private. Our proposed scheme, Randomized Routing with Hidden Address (RRHA), prevents the attackers from obtaining the receiver address by capturing the destination field of the packets or by predicting the location of the sinks by observing the flow of network traffic. We examined the successful delivery rate, packet delay, and protection strength of our proposed scheme by both analysis and simulations.