A Rigorous Approach to Uncovering Security Policy Violations in UML Designs

  • Authors:
  • Lijun Yu;Robert France;Indrakshi Ray;Sudipto Ghosh

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • ICECCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 14th IEEE International Conference on Engineering of Complex Computer Systems
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

There is a need for rigorous analysis techniquesthat developers can use to uncover security policyviolations in their UML designs. There are a few UMLanalysis tools that can be used for this purpose, butthey either rely on theorem-proving mechanisms thatrequire sophisticated mathematical skill to useeffectively, or they are based on model-checkingtechniques that require a “closed-world” view of thesystem (i.e., a system in which there are no inputs fromexternal sources). In this paper we show how alightweight, scenario-based UML design analysisapproach we developed can be used to rigorouslyanalyze a UML design to uncover security policyviolations.In the method, a UML design class model, in whichsecurity policies and operation specifications areexpressed in the Object Constraint Language (OCL), isanalyzed against a set of scenarios describingbehaviors that adhere to and that violate securitypolicies. The method includes a technique forgenerating scenarios. We illustrate how the methodcan be applied through an example involvingrole-based access control policies.