BitTorrent or BitCrunch: Evidence of a Credit Squeeze in BitTorrent?

Authors:
David Hales;Rameez Rahman;Boxun Zhang;Michel Meulpolder;Johan Pouwelse
Affiliations:
-;-;-;-;-
Venue:
WETICE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 18th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructures for Collaborative Enterprises
Year:
2009

Citing 0
Cited 3

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Abstract

BitTorrent is a highly popular peer-to-peer file sharing protocol. Much BitTorrent activity takes place within private virtual communities called "Private Trackers" - a server that allows only community members to share files. Many private trackers implement "ratio enforcement" where the tracker monitors the upload and download behavior of peers. If a peer downloads substantially more than it uploads then service is terminated. Tracker policies related to credit effect the performance of the community as a whole. We identify the possibility of a "credit squeeze" in which performance is reduced due to lack of credit for some peers. We consider statistics from a popular private tracker and results from a simple model (called "BitCrunch").