Matrix analysis
Elements of information theory
Elements of information theory
Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods
Parallel and Distributed Computation: Numerical Methods
Game Theory for Wireless Engineers (Synthesis Lectures on Communications)
Game Theory for Wireless Engineers (Synthesis Lectures on Communications)
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
On the stability of distributed sequence adaptation for cellular asynchronous DS-CDMA systems
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Iterative water-filling for Gaussian vector multiple-access channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Asynchronous Iterative Water-Filling for Gaussian Frequency-Selective Interference Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Distributed multiuser power control for digital subscriber lines
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Spectrum sharing for unlicensed bands
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A game theoretic approach to multi-user spectrum allocation
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
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The interaction of two transmit-receive pairs coexisting in the same area and communicating using the same portion of the spectrum is analyzed from a game theoretic perspective. Each pair utilizes a decentralized iterative water-filling scheme to greedily maximize the individual rate. We study the dynamics of such a game and find properties of the resulting Nash equilibria. The region of achievable operating points is characterized for both low- and high-interference systems, and the dependence on the various system parameters is explicitly shown. We derive the region of possible signal space partitioning for the iterative water-filling scheme and show how the individual utility functions can be modified to alter its range. Utilizing global system knowledge, we design amodified game encouraging better operating points in terms of sum rate compared to those obtained using the iterative water-filling algorithm and show how such a game can be imitated in a decentralized noncooperative setting. Although we restrict the analysis to a two player game, analogous concepts can be used to design decentralized algorithms for scenarios with more players. The performance of the modified decentralized game is evaluated and compared to the iterative water-filling algorithm by numerical simulations.