IEEE Spectrum
An introduction to general systems thinking (silver anniversary ed.)
An introduction to general systems thinking (silver anniversary ed.)
Feynman Lectures on Computation
Feynman Lectures on Computation
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
WORM vs. WORM: preliminary study of an active counter-attack mechanism
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode
The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense
The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense
Temporal search: detecting hidden malware timebombs with virtual machines
Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Minos: Architectural support for protecting control data
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO)
Thwarting network stealth worms in computer networks through biological epidemiology
Thwarting network stealth worms in computer networks through biological epidemiology
Exploiting underlying structure for detailed reconstruction of an internet-scale event
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
Address obfuscation: an efficient approach to combat a board range of memory error exploits
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Fishing for phishes: applying capture-recapture methods to estimate phishing populations
Proceedings of the anti-phishing working groups 2nd annual eCrime researchers summit
On the infeasibility of modeling polymorphic shellcode
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The future of biologically-inspired security: is there anything left to learn?
NSPW '07 Proceedings of the 2007 Workshop on New Security Paradigms
Biologically inspired defenses against computer viruses
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
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The fight against malicious software (or malware, which includes everything from worms to viruses to botnets) is often viewed as an "arms race." Conventional wisdom is that we must continually "raise the bar" for the malware creators. However, the multitude of malware has itself evolved into a complex environment, and properties not unlike those of ecological systems have begun to emerge. This may include competition between malware, facilitation, parasitism, predation, and density-dependent population regulation. Ecological principles will likely be useful for understanding the effects of these ecological interactions, for example, carrying capacity, species-time and species-area relationships, the unified neutral theory of biodiversity, and the theory of island bio-geography. The emerging malware ecology can be viewed as a critical challenge to all aspects of malware defense, including collection, triage, analysis, intelligence estimates, detection, mitigation, and forensics. It can also be viewed as an opportunity. In this position paper, we argue that taking an ecological approach to malware defense will suggest new defenses. In particular, we can exploit the fact that interactions of malware with its environment, and with other malware, are neither fully predictable nor fully controllable by the malware author--yet the emergent behavior will follow general ecological principles that can be exploited for malware defense.