On computing the determinant in small parallel time using a small number of processors
Information Processing Letters
The complexity of elementary algebra and geometry
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Parallel arithmetic computations: a survey
Proceedings of the 12th symposium on Mathematical foundations of computer science 1986
Journal of Symbolic Computation
Journal of Symbolic Computation
On the Newton Polytope of the Resultant
Journal of Algebraic Combinatorics: An International Journal
A product-decomposition bound for Bezout numbers
SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis
Modern computer algebra
On Euclid's Algorithm and the Theory of Subresultants
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The projective noether maple package: computing the dimension of a projective variety
Journal of Symbolic Computation
Sylvester—Habicht sequences and fast Cauchy index computation
Journal of Symbolic Computation
A Gröbner free alternative for polynomial system solving
Journal of Complexity
Probabilistic algorithms for sparse polynomials
EUROSAM '79 Proceedings of the International Symposiumon on Symbolic and Algebraic Computation
Sparse Resultant under Vanishing Coefficients
Journal of Algebraic Combinatorics: An International Journal
Algorithms in Real Algebraic Geometry (Algorithms and Computation in Mathematics)
Algorithms in Real Algebraic Geometry (Algorithms and Computation in Mathematics)
Computing multihomogeneous resultants using straight-line programs
Journal of Symbolic Computation
Solving parametric polynomial systems
Journal of Symbolic Computation
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We present an algorithm to compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with a fixed structure. Using this representation, we also show an algorithm to compute polynomial inequality conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this kind of equilibria. Then, we present symbolic procedures to describe the set of isolated totally mixed Nash equilibria of an arbitrary game and to compute, under certain general assumptions, the exact number of these equilibria. The complexity of all these algorithms is polynomial in the number of players, the number of each player's strategies and the generic number of totally mixed Nash equilibria of a game with the considered structure.