How to Own the Internet in Your Spare Time
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Characteristics of internet background radiation
Proceedings of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet measurement
Toward understanding distributed blackhole placement
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Rapid malcode
Scalability, fidelity, and containment in the potemkin virtual honeyfarm
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Mapping internet sensors with probe response attacks
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Vulnerabilities of passive internet threat monitors
SSYM'05 Proceedings of the 14th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 14
Fast and evasive attacks: highlighting the challenges ahead
RAID'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
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A honeynet is a portion of routed but otherwise unused address space that is instrumented for network traffic monitoring. It is an invaluable tool for understanding unwanted Internet traffic and malicious attacks. We formalize the problem of defending honeynets from systematic mapping (a serious threat to their viability) as a simple two-person game. The objective of the Attacker is to identify a honeynet with a minimum number of probes. The objective of the Defender is to maintain a honeynet for as long as possible before moving it to a new location within a larger address space. Using this game theoretic framework, we describe and prove optimal or near-optimal strategies for both Attacker and Defender. This is the first mathematically rigorous study of this increasingly important problem on honeynet defense. Our theoretical ideas provide the first formalism of the honeynet monitoring problem, illustrate the viability of network address shuffling, and inform the design of next generation honeynet defense.