Pseudo-random functions and parallelizable modes of operations of a block cipher
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
A unified method for improving PRF bounds for a class of blockcipher based MACs
FSE'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Fast software encryption
Constructing rate-1 MACs from related-key unpredictable block ciphers: PGV model revisited
FSE'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Fast software encryption
BCBC: a more efficient MAC algorithm
ISPEC'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information security practice and experience
TrCBC: Another look at CBC-MAC
Information Processing Letters
The sum of CBC MACs is a secure PRF
CT-RSA'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
PMAC with parity: minimizing the query-length influence
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
3kf9: enhancing 3GPP-MAC beyond the birthday bound
ASIACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
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The CBC 驴 MAC or cipher block chaining message authentication code, is a well-known method to generate message authentication codes. Unfortunately, it is not forgery-secure over an arbitrary domain. There are several secure variants of CBC 驴 MAC, among which OMAC is a widely-used candidate. To authenticate an s-block message, OMAC costs (s + 1) block cipher encryptions (one of these is a zero block encryption), and only one block cipher key is used. In this paper, we propose two secure and efficient variants of CBC 驴 MAC: namely, GCBC1 and GCBC2. Our constructions cost only s block cipher encryptions to authenticate an s-block message, for all s 驴 2. Moreover, GCBC2 needs only one block cipher encryption for almost all single block messages, and for all other single block messages, it costs two block cipher encryptions. We have also defined a class of generalized CBC-MAC constructions, and proved a sufficient condition for prf-security. In particular, we have provided an unified prf-security analysis of CBC-type constructions, e.g., XCBC, TMAC and our proposals GCBC1 and GCBC2.