Use of Deception to Improve Client Honeypot Detection of Drive-by-Download Attacks

  • Authors:
  • Barbara Endicott-Popovsky;Julia Narvaez;Christian Seifert;Deborah A. Frincke;Lori Ross O'Neil;Chiraag Aval

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Washington, Washington, USA 98105;University of Washington, Washington, USA 98105;Victoria University of Wellington School of Engineering and Computer Science, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand 6140;Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, USA;Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, USA;University of Washington, Washington, USA 98105

  • Venue:
  • FAC '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Foundations of Augmented Cognition. Neuroergonomics and Operational Neuroscience: Held as Part of HCI International 2009
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

This paper presents the application of deception theory to improve the success of client honeypots at detecting malicious web page attacks from infected servers programmed by online criminals to launch drive-by-download attacks. The design of honeypots faces three main challenges: deception, how to design honeypots that seem real systems; counter-deception, techniques used to identify honeypots and hence defeating their deceiving nature; and counter counter-deception, how to design honeypots that deceive attackers. The authors propose the application of a deception model known as the deception planning loop to identify the current status on honeypot research, development and deployment. The analysis leads to a proposal to formulate a landscape of the honeypot research and planning of steps ahead.