Social Default Theories

  • Authors:
  • Chiaki Sakama

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer and Communication Sciences, Wakayama University, Sakaedani, Japan 640 8510

  • Venue:
  • LPNMR '09 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

This paper studies a default logic for social reasoning in multiagent systems. A social default theory is a collection of default theories with which each agent reasons and behaves by taking attitudes of other agents into account. The semantics of a social default theory is given as social extensions which represent the agreement of beliefs of individual agents in a society. We show the use of social default theories for representing social attitudes of agents and for reasoning in cooperative planning and negotiation among multiple agents.