Fault Injection for Dependability Validation: A Methodology and Some Applications
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Assessing Vulnerability of Proposed Designs for Interdependent Infrastructure Systems
HICSS '04 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'04) - Track 2 - Volume 2
Power Transmission Control Using Distributed Max Flow
COMPSAC '05 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference - Volume 01
The Advanced Electric Power Grid: Complexity Reduction Techniques for Reliability Modeling
SAFECOMP '08 Proceedings of the 27th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
Modelling interdependencies between the electricity and information infrastructures
SAFECOMP'07 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
Reliability modeling for the advanced electric power grid
SAFECOMP'07 Proceedings of the 26th international conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
Integrated cyber-physical fault injection for reliability analysis of the smart grid
SAFECOMP'10 Proceedings of the 29th international conference on Computer safety, reliability, and security
A High-Confidence Cyber-Physical Alarm System: Design and Implementation
GREENCOM-CPSCOM '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE/ACM Int'l Conference on Green Computing and Communications & Int'l Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing
Survey Paper: A survey on the communication architectures in smart grid
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Information flow security in cyber-physical systems
Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
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The advanced electric power grid is a cyber-physical system comprised of physical components, such as transmission lines and generators, and a network of embedded systems deployed for their cyber control. The objective of this paper is to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze the reliability of this cyber-physical system. The original contribution of the approach lies in the scope of failures analyzed, which crosses the cyber-physical boundary by investigating physical manifestations of failures in cyber control. As an example of power electronics deployed to enhance and control the operation of the grid, we study Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices, which are used to alter the flow of power on specific transmission lines. Through prudent fault injection, we enumerate the failure modes of FACTS devices, as triggered by their embedded software, and evaluate their effect on the reliability of the device and the reliability of the power grid on which they are deployed. The IEEE118 bus system is used as our case study, where the physical infrastructure is supplemented with seven FACTS devices to prevent the occurrence of four previously documented potential cascading failures.