A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Child-proof authentication for MIPv6 (CAM)
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
A survey on automatic configuration of virtual private networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Access path based source address validation in mobile IPv6
NPC'11 Proceedings of the 8th IFIP international conference on Network and parallel computing
A Secure Correspondent Router Protocol for NEMO Route Optimization
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration: balancing between security, privacy and usability
FPS'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
Review: A survey of secure protocols in Mobile IPv6
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
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The need for nodes to be able to generate their own address and verify those from others, without relying on a global trusted authority, is a well-known problem in networking. One popular technique for solving this problem is to use self-certifying addresses that are widely used and standardized; a prime example is cryptographically generated addresses (CGA). We re-investigate the attack models that can occur in practice and analyze the security of CGA-like schemes. As a result, an alternative protocol to CGA, called CGA++, is presented. This protocol eliminates several attacks applicable to CGA and increases the overall security. In many ways, CGA++ offers a nice alternative to CGA and can be used notably for future developments of the Internet Protocol version 6.