Silicon physical random functions
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Two-Factor Mobile Authentication Scheme for Secure Financial Transactions
ICMB '05 Proceedings of the International Conference on Mobile Business
Physically Unclonable Function-Based Security and Privacy in RFID Systems
PERCOM '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
Public-Key Cryptography for RFID-Tags
PERCOMW '07 Proceedings of the Fifth IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops
Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation
Proceedings of the 44th annual Design Automation Conference
Privacy preserving multi-factor authentication with biometrics
Journal of Computer Security - The Second ACM Workshop on Digital Identity Management - DIM 2006
Towards Robust Low Cost Authentication for Pervasive Devices
PERCOM '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Sixth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
FPGA Intrinsic PUFs and Their Use for IP Protection
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Unclonable Lightweight Authentication Scheme
ICICS '08 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Panic passwords: authenticating under duress
HOTSEC'08 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Hot topics in security
An improved protocol for demonstrating possession of discrete logarithms and some generalizations
EUROCRYPT'87 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
PUF-HB: a tamper-resilient HB based authentication protocol
ACNS'08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Offline hardware/software authentication for reconfigurable platforms
CHES'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
RFID-Tags for anti-counterfeiting
CT-RSA'06 Proceedings of the 2006 The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
PUF ROKs: generating read-once keys from physically unclonable functions
Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
PEAR: a hardware based protocol authentication system
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGSPATIAL International Workshop on Security and Privacy in GIS and LBS
TRUST'10 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
Enforcing physically restricted access control for remote data
Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
PUF ROKs: a hardware approach to read-once keys
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Physically uncloneable functions in the universal composition framework
CRYPTO'11 Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
PHAP: Password based Hardware Authentication using PUFs
MICROW '12 Proceedings of the 2012 45th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture Workshops
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In this work we utilize a physically unclonable function (PUF) to improve resilience of authentication protocols to various types of compromise. As an example application, we consider users who authenticate at an ATM using their bank-issued PUF and a password. We present a scheme that is provably secure and achieves strong security properties. In particular, we ensure that (i) the user is unable to authenticate without her device; (ii) the device cannot be used by someone else to successfully authenticate as the user; (iii) the device cannot be duplicated (e.g., by a bank employee); (iv) an adversary with full access to the bank's personal and authentication records is unable to impersonate the user even if he obtains access to the device before and/or after the setup; (v) the device does not need to store any information. We also give an extension that endows the solution with emergency capabilities: if a user is coerced into opening her secrets and giving the coercer full access to the device, she gives the coercer alternative secrets whose use notifies the bank of the coercion in such a way that the coercer is unable to distinguish between emergency and normal operation of the protocol.