The computational status of physics

  • Authors:

  • Mike Stannett

  • Affiliations:

  • Department of Computer Science, Regent Court, Sheffield, UK S1 4DP

  • Venue:
  • Natural Computing: an international journal
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical systems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first principles, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as `computing something' in the standard computational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.