A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
Auction-based spectrum sharing
Mobile Networks and Applications
Stackelberg game for utility-based cooperative cognitiveradio networks
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Cooperative diversity in wireless networks: Efficient protocols and outage behavior
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Spectral efficient protocols for half-duplex fading relay channels
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A framework for uplink power control in cellular radio systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Cognitive radio is an enabling technology that allows unlicensed users to opportunistically access the spectrum in order to enhance the spectrum efficiency. In this paper, we consider a cognitive system wherein there exists a primary relay network and a secondary network. In order to efficiently exploit the available spectrum and gain revenues whenever the primary relay infrastructure is not utilized, the primary network leases its unused bandwidth and the idle relay node to the secondary users. As a reimbursement, the secondary users make payments to the primary network based on the service they receive. We first characterize the interactions between the primary and secondary users using a buyer/seller model. Specifically, the price is determined by the primary network such that the revenue is maximized. On the buyer side, given the specified price, the secondary users competitively access the spectrum and employ the primary relay node to forward their packets. Then, we model each secondary user as a selfish player, which aims at maximizing its own benefit through power allocation, and analyze the competition among the secondary users within the framework of non-cooperative game theory. It is shown that, in the game played by the secondary network, there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium point that can be achieved through distributed iterations. Next, we propose a low-complexity algorithm, in which the primary network charges the secondary users at a sub-optimal price and gains close-to-optimal revenues. Extensive simulations are conducted to verify the performance of the proposed methods from both a primary as well as a secondary network perspective.